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Abstract 
 
This study evaluates individuals’ abilities to avoid investment mistakes driven by 
behavioral biases and analyzes the relationship between investment competence and the 
propensity to seek or rely on professional advice. We use novel survey data collected 
from a representative sample of Swiss households. We find that − even after controlling 
for socio-economic and demographic characteristics − investment competence is 
positively related to demand for financial advice. It appears that investors who are at the 
highest risk of making investment mistakes are those who are the least likely to seek help 
from professional advisors. Therefore, supply-side solutions imposed by regulators to 
protect financial customers may not benefit those who need them most. 
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1. Introduction 
A compelling body of research documents that households make serious investment mistakes. 
Among various pieces of evidence are findings that households hold under-diversified 
portfolios (Blume & Friend, 1975; Goetzmann & Kumar, 2008; Kelly, 1995) and exhibit a 
strong preference for local and home country stocks (Calvet et al., 2007; Huberman, 2001). In 
addition, households trade too much (Barber and Odean 2000), sell winners too early and 
hold losers too long (Odean, 1998; Shefrin & Statman, 1985), and they tend to buy a stock 
simply because it catches their attention (Barber & Odean, 2008). As a result, the average 
retail investor tends to underperform the market (Barber et al., 2009). 
By and large there is evidence that individuals who are likely to make investment mistakes 
can avoid poor financial outcomes if they receive help from qualified financial advisors or 
delegate decisions to them1. In fact, the regulation of financial advisors relies, to a large 
extent, on the assumption that advisors are mainly consulted by unsophisticated investors in 
need of help. However, protective regulatory measures can be effective only if 
unsophisticated investors seek the support of professional advisors. Otherwise, regulatory 
measures will not benefit those who need them most.  
In this paper, we assess individuals’ abilities to avoid investment mistakes, and we analyze 
the relationship between investment competence and the propensity to seek or rely on 
professional advice. To assess individuals’ investment competence, we conducted an online 
survey with questions that address biases in the selection and processing of information. 
These biases may lead to investment errors, as documented in the empirical literature on 
behavioral and household finance. We find that − even after controlling for socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics − the demand for financial advice is positively related to 
investment competence. Investors who are less able to avoid investment mistakes are 
significantly more likely to make investment decisions autonomously, whereas investors with 
higher investment competence are significantly more likely to delegate decisions to advisors. 
                                                
1 The question of whether expert financial advice truly benefits retail investors is still under debate, but there is a 
consensus that financial advice may improve retail investors’ portfolio decisions when conflicts of interest are 
minimized (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). There is evidence that professionally-managed portfolios are more 
diversified (Gerhardt & Hackethal, 2009) and exhibit weaker disposition effects than portfolios of retail 
investors (Shapira & Venezia, 2001). Collins (2010) suggests that financial counseling can help individuals 
develop better financial practices. 
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Hence, supply-side solutions imposed by regulators to protect financial customers may not 
benefit those who need them most. Additionally, our results suggest that educational 
initiatives, in particular for self-directed individuals, may be beneficial but that such 
initiatives should provide training in the avoidance of behavioral traps in addition to teaching 
basic financial knowledge. 
To date, the question of whether financial advice is a sufficient remedy for inferior decision-
making has received varied answers. One strand of the literature documents a negative 
relationship between financial literacy and advice seeking. For example, Hackethal et al. 
(2012) study the behavior of German retail investors and conclude that customers with less 
interest in and knowledge of financial matters are more likely than others to rely on advice. In 
a portfolio-choice experiment, Hung & Yoong (2010) find that individuals with low financial 
literacy (both self-assessed and measured) choose to take advice more often than others. 
Frederick (2005) shows that individuals with lower levels of cognitive skills are more risk-
averse, and both Bluethgen et al. (2008) and Gerhardt & Hackethal (2009) find that greater 
risk aversion increases the demand for financial advice. Kramer (2012) finds that banking 
clients who view themselves as less financially literate than others are more likely to ask for 
expert financial assistance. Additionally, Hackethal et al. (2012) find that less sophisticated 
customers are less aware of the problem of conflicts of interest among financial advisors and 
therefore are more inclined to consult and follow the advice of advisors.  
Other studies, however, suggest the opposite relationship between investment competence 
and demand for financial advice, arguing that more sophisticated individuals are more likely 
to seek advice. Lusardi & Mitchell (2006) find that people with higher scores on financial 
literacy questions are more likely than less sophisticated investors to rely on financial experts 
when planning their retirement. Using past portfolio performance as a proxy for financial 
sophistication, Bluethgen et al. (2008) find that wealthier, more sophisticated and more 
experienced clients are more likely to seek advice. Hackethal et al. (2012) confirm the effect 
of investment experience and wealth on the propensity to seek advice and suggest that the 
effect could also be related to the higher opportunity costs of time of wealthier, more 
experienced investors.  
While most previous studies have mainly focused on the deficiency of financial knowledge as 
a source of adverse decisions2, we hypothesize that financial knowledge alone may not be 
sufficient to avoid investment mistakes. Emotions and cognitive errors in the selection and 
                                                
2 Kramer (2012), in addition, considers cognitive ability but fails to find a significant effect on advice seeking. 
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processing of information can prevent individuals from successfully applying knowledge that 
is available. To estimate the impact of these factors, we have designed multiple-choice 
questions addressing some common heuristics that investors may apply when making 
investment decisions. We call the ability to avoid using these heuristics investment 
competence. Hence, our measure of investment competence is complementary to other 
measures used to evaluate general financial knowledge (Brown & Graf, 2013; Calcagno & 
Monticone, 2014; Kramer, 2012; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006; van Rooij et al., 2007). In 
contrast to studies that infer investment competence from observed trading behavior, our 
measure of investment competence aims to capture reasoning driving suboptimal trading 
decisions that is not directly observable in trading data. Additionally, we target retail 
investors, as they are usually less experienced and face stronger financial restrictions when 
they decide to invest on the financial markets than banking clients or customers of brokerage 
firms. Hence, the questions of whether retail investors require an advisor and are willing to 
demand advisory services are of particular importance for them.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data, 
provide descriptive statistics, explain how we assess investment competence and describe our 
control variables. Section 3 presents and elaborates on our results and discusses endogeneity 
issues. The results of robustness tests are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our 
findings and concludes the paper. 
2. Data Description 
2.1. The Sample 
Our dataset was generated by an online survey with 1,016 individuals from the German-, 
Italian-, and French-speaking regions of Switzerland. The participants in our survey were 
recruited from a pool of individuals provided by a professional market research agency in 
Switzerland that has experience conducting surveys on financial topics. In exchange for their 
participation, individuals answering most of the questions participated in a raffle in which an 
iPad was awarded to the winner.3 The questions were originally written in German. We used 
                                                
3 Compensation type did not significantly impact respondents’ answers. In a separate study, we found that a 
fixed payment (CHF 10) did not motivate students to answer the questions differently than a chance of winning 
an iPad, with a market price of approximately CHF 800, raffled off among 100 respondents. 
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professional interpreters employed by the market research agency to translate the questions 
into French and Italian.   
The sample is representative of the underlying population with respect to age, gender and 
geographic location. As Table 1 shows, the respondents were 48 years old on average. Fifty-
four percent of the respondents were male, 30% had degrees from schools of applied sciences 
(“Hochschule”), and 18% had university degrees. Overall, 44% of the respondents stated that 
their annual disposable income was between CHF 50,000 and CHF 100,000 (USD 48,500 and 
USD 97,000 as of December 2010)4. Notably, 38% estimated the value of their wealth 
(including savings and financial investments) to be above CHF 100,000.   
2.2. Assessing Investment Competence 
Generally, investment mistakes can result from a lack of specific knowledge and an inability 
to apply such knowledge effectively. In some cases, financial knowledge is sufficient to 
prevent suboptimal investment behavior.5 However, knowledge level does not guarantee 
optimal investment behavior. Emotions and cognitive errors in the selection and processing of 
information can prevent the successful application of knowledge, as suggested by the vast 
body of research on behavioral biases.  
In this study, we use multiple-choice questions that aim to evaluate individual’s ability to 
avoid biases such as the availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), the representativeness 
bias (Kahneman et al., 1974), probability matching (Vulkan, 2000), and probability weighting 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as well as their ability to avoid investment mistakes such as 
under-diversification (Polkovnichenko, 2005) and the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 
1985). An English version of the question is given in Appendix B. We refer to the ability to 
avoid investment mistakes as investment competence.  
Table 2 shows how participants answered our investment competence questions, the 
percentage of participants who answered the questions in a biased way and the distribution of 
the biased answers. ”Don’t know” answers are treated as unbiased.6 The respondents made 
                                                
4 The average annual disposable income per household in 2010 was 81,900 Swiss francs (USD 78,600 as of Dec. 
2010). Source: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/20/02/blank/key/einkommen0/niveau.html 
5 For example, Dhar & Zhu (2006) find that individuals with higher financial literacy are more likely to avoid 
suboptimal portfolio decisions, such as those associated with the disposition effect. 
6 The results remain qualitatively the same if we treat “Don’t know” answers as missing. Although the number 
of observations decreases, the impact of the investment competence index remains significant (see Table C.4 in 
the appendix). 
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the most errors in recalling and comparing the past returns of asset classes, deciding how 
many assets are needed for portfolio diversification and assessing the attractiveness of assets 
with large but unlikely payoffs. Participants made the fewest mistakes in deciding whether to 
take risks after losses, estimating the probability of losses from long-term investments and 
comparing the importance of different performance drivers. Overall, 50% of the participants 
answered between four and five questions incorrectly, 0.4% (4 individuals) made no mistakes, 
and 0.9% (8 individuals) answered 9 of 11 questions incorrectly, providing the highest 
number of incorrect answers in the group. Notably, 9% failed to answer at least one question.  
To obtain an overall measure of the individual’s ability to avoid investment mistakes, one 
could compute the number of biased answers. However, the disadvantage of this approach is 
that each question receives the same weight, even though the degree of discrepancy between 
the biased and unbiased answers differs from question to question (see Table 2). Essentially, 
the questions may differ in their difficulty levels, as they address different investment 
mistakes. The latter can be driven by financial knowledge but also by emotional or cognitive 
factors.7 For this reason, we use a relative measure based on a weighting scheme that 
considers this issue.8 9 The weights apply a higher penalty to mistakes in answering questions 
where a larger proportion of the participants answered correctly (“easy questions”) and a 
lower penalty to mistakes in answering “difficult” questions. For example, the question 
“performance drivers” can be considered as an “easy question,” as 76% of the respondents 
answered it correctly. Hence, mistakes in answering this question receive a weight of 0.76, 
which is relatively high.  
2.3. Demand for Financial Advice 
Financial advisors can be endowed with decision-making authority or play a purely advisory 
role. Swiss banks offer both options only to wealthy individuals, but some independent 
advisors offer advisory services to less wealthy individuals as well. We asked respondents to 
                                                
7 In fact, the correlations between the bivariate variables indicating investment mistakes are relatively low 
(except for the last two questions, which both address the disposition effect). This observation suggests that our 
investment mistakes questions do not necessarily have a common driver. 
8 The weighting scheme is the first step of the PRIDIT scoring method devised by Brockett et al. (2002), who 
use it to assess insurance fraud based on several indicator variables. In the second step, a principle component 
analysis is used to analyze the rescaled responses. Lusardi et al. (2012) use this method to assess financial 
literacy among the elderly in the U.S. We do not employ the second step because the responses to our investment 
competence questions show little correlation. 
9 Our qualitative results hold with alternative specifications, as discussed in Section 4. 
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consider their present or a potential financial advisor (at a bank or otherwise) whom they view 
as reliable and then choose the option that best describes their current attitude toward 
acquiring and relying on the advice. The distribution of answers is summarized in Table 3.  
Twenty-two percent of all respondents state that they prefer to make investment decisions 
autonomously, 60% would consult one or several advisors before making decisions, and 15% 
would rely largely or completely on an advisor. Calcagno & Monticone (2014) asked a 
similar question of banking clients in Italy in 2007. Of the clients who participated in the 
survey, 12% indicated that they make their decisions autonomously. The higher percentage of 
self-directed individuals in our sample (22%) could be a function of the participants’ ages. 
Some studies provide evidence that younger individuals are more likely to make investment 
decisions autonomously (Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Bluethgen et al., 2008; Hackethal et al., 
2012; Kelly, 1995). In our sample, 56% of the participants are less than 50 years old, whereas 
the percentage of banking clients under 50 in the sample of Calcagno & Monticone (2014) is 
38%. The results that we report below support this finding. 
To avoid estimation difficulties that can result from the use of too few observations in a given 
category, we pool participants who are willing to delegate all decisions with those who are 
willing to delegate most decisions. As a result, we obtain a dependent variable with four 
categories. 
2.4. Control Variables 
Similar to other studies on advice seeking we include age, gender, household’s income, 
household’s wealth, real estate ownership, investment experience, self-employment status and 
education as controls in our regressions. As additional control variables, we assess 
individuals’ degree of reliance on various information sources, specifically, the perceived 
importance of price movements, media news, friends’ recommendations, own judgments, and 
the opinions of one’s own advisor and of several advisors. For the average participant in our 
sample, the most important source of information is one’s own opinions, followed by price 
movements and the opinions of one’s advisor (see Table 4). Moreover, individuals appear to 
simultaneously rely on more than one information source (see Panel B). A principal 
component analysis indicates that reliance on information sources can be captured by three 
components. The first includes reliance on price movements, media news and one’s own 
opinion; the second captures reliance on one or several advisors; the third is based on reliance 
on friends’ recommendations (see Table C.3 in the appendix). 
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Our proxy for investment experience is based on self-reports (see Table C.1 in the appendix). 
The average respondent in our sample has only limited investment experience, and 22% of 
respondents state that they do not have any investment experience at all. In contrast, only 1% 
of respondents state that they have extensive experience in all asset classes. We use principle 
competent analysis to build an index of investment experience (see Table C.2 in the 
appendix). 
Table 5 shows the average values of our control variables for each group of respondents, 
indicating different propensities to seek advice. In particular, we see that advice seeking 
increases with the level of investment competence. The statistical significance of this 
observation after controlling for various demographic and socio-economic variables is tested 
in the next section. 
3. Results 
We present our empirical findings in this section. First, we show our results regarding the 
relationship between investment competence and advice seeking. Then we analyze the 
direction of causation and perform various robustness checks. 
3.1. Investment Competence and Advice Seeking 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between individuals’ investment competences and 
their propensities to make investment decisions autonomously, to consult one or several 
advisors and to delegate decisions. While the relationship between investment competence 
and some of the control variables (in particular, gender, income, and real estate ownership) is 
statistically significant (see Table C.6 in the appendix), the corresponding interaction terms 
do not significantly affect delegation decisions (see Table C.5 in the appendix). In the 
analysis that follows, we consider only the main effect of investment competence on the 
delegation decision. Table 6 reports the marginal effects of partially proportional odds 
estimates on the probability of choosing one of the four delegation options. The results show 
that investment competence positively influences the demand for financial advice. When 
investment competence increases, the probability of delegating decisions increases; when 
investment competence decreases, the probability of deciding autonomously increases. 
Individuals with lower investment competence are also more inclined to consult one than 
several advisors before deciding, and this attitude cannot be fully explained by socio-
economic variables such as income and financial wealth.  
 9 
Other interesting observations emerge from comparing the effects of different information 
sources. Confident individuals rely on information inferred from media and previous price 
movements (see correlations in Table 4), and the stronger their confidence in their own 
judgment, the more likely they are to decide autonomously and not delegate decisions to 
advisors. As expected, the perceived value of an advisor’s recommendation increases the 
probability of consulting an advisor and of delegating decisions and decreases the probability 
of deciding autonomously. Interestingly, individuals who rely on the recommendations of 
friends are more likely to consult several advisors and less likely to delegate decisions. It 
appears that friends’ recommendations support individuals’ confidence in their own 
investment competence, so that individuals prefer not to delegate decisions. However, 
friends’ recommendations are taken with greater caution than media news and price 
movements.  
The impact of self-assessed investment experience on demand for financial advice is also 
worth noting. Similarly to the perceived importance of media news, price movements and 
own judgment, a stronger sense of experience increases the probability of deciding 
autonomously and decreases the probability of delegating decisions. Additionally, individuals 
who feel more experienced are less likely to consult several advisors and more likely to rely 
on the opinion of one advisor when making decisions. Stated investment experience appears 
to reflect perceived investment competence. However, we find that the relationship between 
perceived and assessed investment competence is not significant (see Table C.6 in the 
appendix). If perceived and assessed investment competence are not correlated, then self-
directed investors appear to be trapped. Those who remain longer in the market demand less 
financial advice but at the same time do not exhibit a stronger ability to avoid investment 
mistakes than others, i.e., the probability of surviving without advice is theoretically lower 
than previously anticipated by decision-makers. 
Finally, we find that some of the variables that capture the opportunity costs of time define an 
additional driver of demand for financial advice. In our sample, individuals with relatively 
little wealth (<100,000 CHF) are less likely than wealthy clients (>300,000 CHF) to delegate 
decisions or consult several advisors and are more likely to decide autonomously. This is in 
line with previous studies that find that the demand for advisory services increases with 
wealth (Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Bluethgen et al., 2008; Calcagno & Monticone, 2014; 
Guiso & Jappelli, 2006). We also find that the demand for financial advice increases with age, 
which is consistent with previous findings (Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Bluethgen et al., 2008; 
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Hackethal et al., 2012; Kelly, 1995). Gender, higher education, self-employment status, 
household size, real estate ownership and income appear to be unrelated to decisions to seek 
financial advice or to delegate financial decisions.  
In summary, self-directed individuals are more likely to be younger, less wealthy, feel more 
experienced, have lower levels of investment competence, and rely more on their own 
judgment, on price movements and on media news and less on the opinions of advisors than 
other individuals. Individuals who consult advisors before making investment decisions have 
the same profile as self-directed individuals but rely more heavily on advisors’ opinions and 
pay less attention to price movements, media news and their own judgment. Individuals who 
delegate decisions are more likely to have higher investment competence and to rely less 
heavily on media news, price movements and their own judgment and more heavily on the 
opinions of advisors. They are also older, wealthier and feel less experienced in investment 
matters than others. Individuals who consult several advisors before making investment 
decisions have a profile similar to that of individuals who delegate decisions but rely more 
strongly on the recommendations of friends.  
3.2. Discussion 
Why do some individuals with low investment competence make investment decisions 
autonomously? One reason may be a lack of self-awareness. As Kruger & Dunning (1999) 
suggest, less competent individuals are likely to lack the ability to recognize the limits of their 
competence. To test this hypothesis, we assume that awareness in the limits of the own 
competence is reflected in the perceived importance of the own judgment in investment 
questions. If individuals are aware of the limits of their competence, we should observe a 
positive relationship between investment competence and the reliance on the own judgment. 
The results reported in Table C.6 in the appendix suggest that the degree of reliance on their 
own judgment is in general not significantly correlated with investment competence.   
An alternative explanation for the positive relationship between investment competence and 
advice seeking is relates to regret aversion. For a regret-averse decision-maker, consulting an 
advisor or delegating decisions is risky because the advisor could reveal mistakes in the 
individual’s previous decisions. Such regret tends to be stronger for individuals who are more 
involved in the decision-making process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). If we proxy 
involvement in the decision-making process by the perceived importance of one’s own 
judgment as a source of information, we may conclude that self-directed individuals are most 
likely to feel regret because they rely most heavily on their own judgments (see Table 6). The 
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same arguments explain why advice seeking increases with investment competence. 
Individuals with higher levels of investment competence may also lack awareness of their 
abilities but may be less prone to regret in delegating decisions because they are less involved 
in their investment decisions than are self-directed individuals.  
It is also possible that more competent individuals anticipate advisors’ incentives to reveal 
superior information only to the most knowledgeable clients, as suggested by Collins (2010), 
Calcagno & Monticone (2014) and Bucher-Koenen & Koenen (2011). This is possible 
because better-informed investors are more likely to identify the correct decision by using 
their own information, so that the advisor is better off providing them truthful 
recommendations. Poorly informed investors may choose the action preferred by the advisor 
even if the latter does not provide them with superior information and this may offsets the 
reputational cost of providing uninformative advice. More competent individuals may also 
consume more advisory services because of their lower marginal costs of information 
processing (Bluethgen et al., 2008).  
3.3. Endogeneity Issues 
The fact that individuals with higher investment competence are more likely to consult with 
advisors and delegate decisions does not necessarily indicate the direction of causation within 
this relationship. Individuals with higher levels of investment competence may consult 
advisors to learn from them rather than rely on their recommendations. To shed light on this 
issue, we employ an instrumental variable analysis, where the dependent variable is the level 
of investment competence, and the independent variables include an indicator variable for 
preference for consulting one or several advisors or delegating decisions (instrumented 
variable). The exogenous variables remain the same as in previous analysis (reliance on price 
movements, media news, own judgment and friends as information sources, investment 
experience, and demographic and socio-economic characteristics). We use the score from the 
principle component analysis summarizing the perceived importance of advisor(s) opinion as 
an instrument. The results of the instrumental variable analysis are reported in Table 7. In the 
upper part of the table, we include the estimation results of a logistic regression with the 
indicator variable for consulting advisor(s) or delegation as dependent variable and all 
exogenous variables and the instrument as independent variables. The results show that the 
stated importance of advisor(s) opinion significantly influences the decision to consult 
advisor(s) or delegate decisions. In the second stage, we use the predicted probabilities from 
the first stage as instruments for consulting advisor(s) or delegating decisions and estimate the 
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impact of the instrumented variable on the investment competence. We observe that 
individuals who consult advisor(s) or delegate decisions have a higher but statistically 
insignificant level of investment competence. We conclude that the previously observed 
positive relationship between investment competence and delegation is most likely not related 
to learning from an advisor(s).  
4. Robustness Tests 
As discussed in Section 2.2, our index of investment competence is constructed using the 
weighted sums of investment mistakes. A higher (lower) penalty is assigned to an incorrect 
answer when a larger proportion of respondents answer the question correctly (incorrectly). 
As a robustness check, we estimate the relationship between investment competence and the 
propensity to seek and rely on advice under alternative specifications of the investment 
competence index. The first index of investment competence uses the sums of the 
respondents’ investment mistakes. The next index introduces weights for the last two 
questions to account for their relatively high correlation. Table 8 reports these estimation 
results, which show that the effect of investment incompetence remains qualitatively 
unchanged. 
One might argue that, for individuals with low investment competence, autonomous 
investment decisions are not costly because such individuals do not participate in the financial 
markets, and thus, their investment mistakes appear only “on paper.” To test this conjecture, 
we use stated investment experience as a proxy for participation in the financial markets and 
re-estimate the impact of investment competence on advice seeking by excluding all 
individuals without investment experience.  
Table 9 reports the marginal effects of investment competence on the probability of choosing 
one of the delegation options within this particular subsample. Clearly, the effects of 
investment competence and of the control variables on the probability of delegating decisions 
are qualitatively the same as in the full sample. We conclude that, if individuals do not learn 
from their experience, the “paper mistakes” they make when answering our questions are 
likely to materialize unless the investors delegate their decisions.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we assess the ability of retail investors to avoid investment mistakes and the 
likelihood that investors will seek help from professional advisors. We find that individuals 
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with lower investment competence are more likely to make decisions autonomously. This 
result holds even after controlling for various factors such as reliance on particular 
information sources, and socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In particular, we 
find that younger individuals with lower investment competence, who feel more experienced 
and who rely more strongly on price movements, media news and own judgment are more 
likely than others to make investment decisions autonomously. This result is robust to 
alternative specifications of investment competence and is unlikely to be driven by investors 
with no investment experience. Additionally, we find that it is unlikely that individuals who 
consult one or several advisors or delegate decisions have higher investment competence 
because they learn from their advisors.  
Our results indicate that the individuals most in need of financial advice are those who are 
least likely to seek it out and rely on it. Hence, supply-side solutions aiming to protect 
customers may not reach those who need them most. On the other hand, letting self-directed 
individuals learn “by doing” may not be effective, as some mistakes are not easy to identify 
(Koestner et al., 2012). Learning by doing in this context is also irrational, as people tend to 
overweight their own experience relative to broader patterns of evidence. Hence, if the aim is 
to improve the investment competence of individuals, there is scope for educational initiatives 
on the demand-side that address the impact of heuristics on investment performance. 
Additional research should be undertaken to develop a better understanding of the conditions 
under which people learn to avoid heuristics, determine the limits of their investment 
competence and thus seek professional help.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 mean st. dev. min. max. N 
      
female 0.46    1016 income:     967 
<CHF 50,000  0.10     CHF 50,000-100,000  0.45     CHF 100,000-150,000  0.31     >CHF 150,000  0.14     financial wealth      926 
<CHF 100,000  0.65     CHF 100,000-200,000 0.19     CHF 200,000-300,000  0.07     >CHF 300,000  0.09     self-employment 0.10    1003 education level:     1006 
primary school 0.07     secondary school 0.34     grammar school 0.10     applied sciences 0.31     university 0.18     residence:     1016 
German-speaking 0.70     French-speaking 0.20     Italian-speaking 0.10     age 48 0.12 25 69 1016 
household size 2.6 1.31 1 5 1012 
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Table 2: Investment mistakes 
 
a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) NA Participants with investment mistakes 
past returns 2% 29% 12% 26% 24% 3% 2% 1% 1% 75% 
past risks 3% 2% 3% 5% 42% 7% 33% 3% 2% 56% 
performance drivers 76% 6% 17%      1% 23% 
risk diversification 17% 52% 29%      2% 69% 
time diversification 10% 59% 29%      2% 10% 
investing on a random walk 40% 57%       3% 57% 
reasons for continuing investing 14% 20% 34% 31%     1% 34% 
large unlikely payoffs 70% 8% 20%      2% 8% 
risk-taking after losses 1% 4% 36% 37% 22%    1% 5% 
behavior after losses 11% 3% 39% 46%     1% 53% 
behavior after gains 58% 9% 31%      2% 67% 
           
number of mistakes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
frequency 4 17 47 136 219 221 178 78 18 8 0 0 
cumulative prob. distribution 0.4% 2.3% 7.3% 22.0% 45.7% 69.5% 88.7% 97.2% 99.1% 100%   
 
Note: The table shows the distribution of answers to the investment competence questions. The shaded numbers are 
the percentages of individuals whom we consider able to avoid mistakes. The lower part of the table shows the 
number of investment mistakes and its probability distribution. The questions and possible answers are included in 
the appendix. 
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Table 3: Demand for financial advice 
Which of the following statements best describes your willingness to delegate financial decisions to your present 
or a potential advisor whom you consider reliable? 
 
  
I prefer to decide autonomously; the advisor should only execute my decisions 23% 
I prefer to tell my advisor how I would decide and would ask for his opinion 25% 
I prefer to get several opinions before I decide 35% 
I would trust my advisor in most decisions 14% 
I would let my advisor decide everything 1% 
Non-participation 2% 
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Table 4: Information sources 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 1 2 3 N 
 price 
movements 
media news friends’ 
opinion 
own 
judgment 
own advisor’s 
opinion 
price movements 29% 38% 33% 979      
media news 27% 57% 16% 977 0.468     
friends’ opinions 35% 52% 13% 971 -0.051 0.165    
own judgment 9% 49% 42% 975 0.391 0.326 0.269   
own advisor's opinion 21% 53% 26% 974 0.079 0.094 0.132 0.022  
opinions of several advisors 37% 47% 16% 962 0.229 0.140 0.207 0.011 0.554 
 
Note: The table reports summary statistics and polychoric correlations between statements on the perceived importance of 
information sources. The statements are ordinal variables taking values of 1 (“low importance”), 2 (“average importance”), 
and 3 (“high importance”).  
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Table 5: Control variables 
 decide 
autonomously 
consult 
an advisor 
consult 
several advisors 
delegate 
decisions 
investment competence -2.27  -2.22  -2.10  -2.07  
price movements, media news, own judgment  3.61   3.59   3.55   3.21  
opinion of advisor(s)  2.11   2.65   2.52   2.97  
friends’ recommendations  2.15   2.18   2.40   2.09  
investment experience index  4.40   4.28   4.02   3.86  
age 45.9 48.4 47.1 48.7 
female 43% 45% 43% 50% 
higher education 48% 49% 52% 50% 
self employment 9% 13% 9% 12% 
real estate ownership 63% 68% 58% 61% 
household size 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 
income (no statement) 3% 2% 1% 1% 
income (<CHF 50,000) 10% 8% 8% 8% 
income (CHF 50,000-100,000) 40% 47% 40% 47% 
income (CHF 100,000-150,000) 31% 26% 31% 33% 
income (>CHF 150,000) 16% 17% 19% 12% 
financial wealth (no statement) 5% 3% 1% 1% 
financial wealth  (<CHF 100,000) 63% 55% 62% 57% 
financial wealth (CHF 100,000-200,000) 16% 19% 18% 18% 
financial wealth (CHF 200,000-300,000) 5% 7% 8% 5% 
financial wealth (>CHF 300,000) 11% 16% 11% 19% 
German-speaking 71% 70% 72% 67% 
French-speaking 16% 18% 21% 24% 
Italian-speaking 13% 12% 7% 9% 
 
Note: The table shows the distribution of characteristics for each group of individuals with the same willingness to delegate 
decisions. The distributions of characteristics are summarized by their means.  
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Table 6: Advice seeking drivers 
 
 decide autonomously 
consult 
an advisor 
consult 
several advisors 
delegate 
decisions 
     
investment competence index -0.0291** -0.0173** 0.0263** 0.0201** 
 (0.0123) (0.00751) (0.0113) (0.00851) 
price movements, media news, own judgment 0.0467*** 0.0139 -0.00198 -0.0587*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0126) 
advisor(s) opinion -0.148*** 0.0469** 0.00615 0.0945*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0124) 
friends’ recommendations -0.0305 -0.0411* 0.110*** -0.0383** 
 (0.0197) (0.0219) (0.0238) (0.0152) 
investment experience index 0.0192** 0.0114** -0.0174** -0.0133** 
 (0.00808) (0.00495) (0.00743) (0.00561) 
age -0.00282*** -0.00168*** 0.00255*** 0.00195*** 
 (0.00105) (0.000649) (0.000966) (0.000733) 
female 0.00749 0.00444 -0.00678 -0.00515 
 (0.0225) (0.0133) (0.0203) (0.0154) 
higher education -0.00382 -0.00227 0.00346 0.00263 
 (0.0230) (0.0137) (0.0208) (0.0159) 
self-employment -0.0105 -0.00649 0.00946 0.00748 
 (0.0318) (0.0205) (0.0287) (0.0236) 
real estate ownership 0.0308 0.0190 -0.0278 -0.0220 
 (0.0233) (0.0150) (0.0211) (0.0173) 
household size -0.00494 -0.00294 0.00448 0.00341 
 (0.00862) (0.00515) (0.00781) (0.00595) 
income (no statement) -0.0586 -0.0458 0.0509 0.0535 
 (0.0869) (0.0861) (0.0679) (0.105) 
income (<CHF 50,000) 0.0227 0.0123 -0.0205 -0.0145 
 (0.0526) (0.0257) (0.0473) (0.0310) 
income (CHF 50,000-100,000) 0.00258 0.00153 -0.00233 -0.00177 
 (0.0332) (0.0197) (0.0301) (0.0228) 
income (CHF 100,000-150,000) -0.0232 -0.0145 0.0210 0.0167 
 (0.0310) (0.0202) (0.0279) (0.0233) 
financial wealth (no statement) 0.331** 0.00124 -0.235*** -0.0972*** 
 (0.164) (0.0617) (0.0840) (0.0228) 
financial wealth (<CHF 100,000) 0.0769** 0.0485** -0.0686** -0.0569** 
 (0.0349) (0.0233) (0.0306) (0.0278) 
financial wealth (CHF 100,000-200,000) 0.0694 0.0326** -0.0619 -0.0402* 
 (0.0453) (0.0164) (0.0394) (0.0222) 
financial wealth (CHF 200,000-300,000) 0.0465 0.0224 -0.0416 -0.0273 
 (0.0560) (0.0214) (0.0493) (0.0281) 
French-speaking -0.0175 -0.0110 0.0159 0.0127 
 (0.0258) (0.0171) (0.0233) (0.0196) 
Italian-speaking 0.0714* 0.0314** -0.0634* -0.0395** 
 (0.0418) (0.0133) (0.0359) (0.0188) 
N    811 
Pseudo R2    0.0946 
 
Note: The table reports estimated marginal effects of partially proportional odds estimates on the probabilities of choosing 
one of the four delegation options. The base categories for the indicator variables are: male, lower education, employed or 
job-seeking, no real estate ownership, household’s income > CHF 150,000, financial wealth > CHF 300,000, German-
speaking. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by asterisks: 
*** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1.  
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Table 7: Two-stage least square estimation results 
First-stage: logistic regression  consulting advisor(s)/delegation 
  
odds ratio 
importance of advisor(s) opinion 2.567*** 
 (0.298) 
other regressors (not reported)  
  
N 880 
 
Main equation:  investment competence 
  
consulting advisor(s)/delegation 0.270 
(0.291) 
  
N 815 
  
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic (Chi-sq(1) p-value) 74.3 (0.000) 
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Table 8: Robustness tests on index construction 
 decide autonomously 
consult 
an advisor 
consult 
several advisors 
delegate 
decisions 
Investment competence index (basis)  -0.0291** -0.0173** 0.0263** 0.0201** 
 (0.0123) (0.00751) (0.0113) (0.00851) 
Investment competence index 1 -0.0122* -0.00726* 0.0110* 0.00845* 
 (0.00652) (0.00394) (0.00594) (0.00452) 
Investment competence index 2 -0.0152** -0.00906** 0.0138** 0.0105** 
 (0.00734) (0.00446) (0.00672) (0.00510) 
 
Note: The table reports the marginal effect of alternative investment competence indices on the probability of choosing one 
of the options regarding delegation in generalized logit regressions. The repressors (not reported here) are the same as in 
Table 6. Robust standards errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by asterisks: 
*** p ≤ 0.01,  ** p ≤ 0.05,  * p ≤ 0.1. Index 1 is based on the number of investment mistakes (without weights). Index 2 is similar 
to Index 1 but it averages the mistakes in the last two questions to take into account for their high correlation. 
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Table 9: Robustness test on a subsample of participants with some investment experience 
 decide 
autonomously 
consult 
an advisor 
consult 
several advisors 
delegate 
decisions 
     
investment competence index -0.0288** -0.0185** 0.0281** 0.0193** 
 (0.0132) (0.00876) (0.0131) (0.00892) 
price movements, media news, own judgment 0.0449*** 0.0289*** -0.0437*** -0.0300*** 
 (0.0144) (0.00980) (0.0144) (0.00980) 
advisor(s) opinion -0.154*** 0.0507** 0.00600 0.0977*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0212) (0.0220) (0.0136) 
friends’ recommendations -0.0134 -0.0482** 0.104*** -0.0428** 
 (0.0211) (0.0240) (0.0266) (0.0167) 
investment experience index 0.0280*** 0.0180*** -0.0273*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.00945) (0.00640) (0.00940) (0.00643) 
age -0.00269** -0.00173** 0.00262** 0.00180** 
 (0.00117) (0.000781) (0.00116) (0.000795) 
female 0.0319 0.0199 -0.0309 -0.0208 
 (0.0251) (0.0153) (0.0244) (0.0161) 
higher education 0.00821 0.00529 -0.00800 -0.00550 
 (0.0254) (0.0164) (0.0248) (0.0171) 
self employment 0.00987 0.00610 -0.00959 -0.00638 
 (0.0356) (0.0211) (0.0344) (0.0222) 
real estate ownership 0.0383 0.0264 -0.0374 -0.0274 
 (0.0254) (0.0189) (0.0248) (0.0195) 
household size -0.0126 -0.00813 0.0123 0.00845 
 (0.00966) (0.00631) (0.00947) (0.00650) 
income (no statement) -0.0782 -0.0739 0.0724 0.0797 
 (0.0921) (0.120) (0.0693) (0.143) 
income (<CHF 50,000) -0.000324 -0.000209 0.000316 0.000217 
 (0.0578) (0.0373) (0.0563) (0.0388) 
income (CHF 50,000-100,000) -0.00210 -0.00135 0.00204 0.00140 
 (0.0357) (0.0230) (0.0348) (0.0239) 
income (CHF 100,000-150,000) -0.00220 -0.00142 0.00214 0.00148 
 (0.0339) (0.0220) (0.0330) (0.0228) 
financial wealth (no statement) 0.369* -0.0172 -0.255*** -0.0961*** 
 (0.200) (0.0903) (0.0913) (0.0235) 
financial wealth (<CHF 100,000) 0.0853** 0.0560** -0.0820** -0.0593** 
 (0.0370) (0.0249) (0.0350) (0.0270) 
financial wealth (CHF 100,000-200,000) 0.0752 0.0372** -0.0708* -0.0415* 
 (0.0471) (0.0176) (0.0426) (0.0218) 
financial wealth (CHF 200,000-300,000) 0.0897 0.0373** -0.0825 -0.0445* 
 (0.0631) (0.0152) (0.0540) (0.0236) 
French-speaking 0.0120 0.00739 -0.0116 -0.00774 
 (0.0326) (0.0192) (0.0315) (0.0203) 
Italian-speaking 0.0437 0.0232 -0.0417 -0.0252 
 (0.0431) (0.0186) (0.0402) (0.0215) 
N    652 
Pseudo R2    0.0927 
 
Note: The table reports marginal effects on the probability of choosing one of the options regarding delegation in a 
generalized logit regression on a subsample excluding individuals indicating no investment experience in any asset class. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by asterisks: *** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1.  
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Appendix 
A Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
female dummy variable: 1: female 
higher education dummy variable: 1: school of applied sciences or university 
self-employment dummy variable: 1: status is self-employment 
age ordinal variable: number of years 
bonds world ordinal variable: experience with international bonds investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
Swiss bonds ordinal variable: experience with Swiss bonds investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
equity world ordinal variable: experience with international equity investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
Swiss equity ordinal variable: experience with Swiss equity investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
alternative investments ordinal variable: experience with alternative investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
price movements ordinal variable: perceived importance of price movements (1: not important - 3: very important) 
news in media ordinal variable: perceived importance of media news (1: not important - 3: very important) 
friends’ opinion ordinal variable: perceived importance of friends’ opinion (1: not important - 3: very important) 
own judgment ordinal variable: perceived importance of own judgment (1: not important - 3: very important) 
opinion own advisor ordinal variable: perceived importance of the own advisor’s opinion (1: not important - 3: very 
important) 
opinion many advisors ordinal variable: perceived importance of the opinion of many advisors (1: not important - 3: very 
important) 
German-speaking dummy variable: 1: residence in a German-speaking region 
French-speaking dummy variable: 1: residence in a French-speaking region 
Italian-speaking dummy variable: 1: residence in an Italian-peaking region 
investment competence ordinal variable 
 
B Investment Competence Questions 
Unbiased answers are given in italics. 
past returns Considering a long-term time period (e.g., 30 years), which assets normally are characterized by the 
highest returns? a) cash b) gold c) bonds d) real estate financial investments e) stocks f) commodities g) 
hedge funds h) private equity 
past risks Normally, which assets are characterized by the highest risk in the short-term (e.g., 1-2 years)?  
a) cash b) gold c) bonds d) real estate financial investments e) stocks f) commodities g) hedge funds h) 
private equity  
performance 
drivers 
Investment success depends on several factors. Which of the following factors contributes most? 
a) long-term allocation of wealth over several asset classes b) over- and underweighting of asset classes in 
the short-term c) security selection within asset classes 
risk diversification How many single stocks are needed to achieve a good dispersion of risk?  
a) 1-5 stocks b) 5-10 stocks c) more than 10 stocks 
time 
diversification 
If one assumes that the average return on the Swiss stock market is 5% per year, then the probability of a 
loss after one year is 40%. What is the probability of a loss after 5 years?  
a) 40% or more b) less than 40% c) I cannot make such an estimation 
investing on a 
random walk 
Suppose that the market price of a stock moves randomly and in more than half of cases rises. Which 
strategy would you prefer?  
a) buy and hold the stock until I need the money b) buy and hold the stock until I achieve a certain gain, 
then sell and buy the stock again at a lower price. 
continuing 
investing 
Suppose you bought a financial asset. Which of the following factors do you consider most important for 
you in remaining invested, i.e., keeping the asset?  
a) that I made a gain with the asset b) that the asset follows a positive trend at the moment c) that the 
investment idea still holds true d) I cannot decide because I have no investment experience with financial 
assets. 
large unlikely 
payoffs 
Suppose you want to invest a large portion of your wealth for 1-2 years. Which of the following 
investments is more attractive to you?  
a) asset A, which offers a chance to win 10’000 Swiss francs in 50 of 100 cases b) asset B, which offers a 
chance to win 50’000 Swiss francs in 10 of 100 cases c) both assets are equally attractive 
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risk taking after 
losses 
How do you assess the correctness of the following rule: “After large losses, one should take more risk to 
compensate for the losses”  
a) always true b) often true c) sometimes true d) never true e) I cannot decide 
behavior after 
losses 
Suppose you bought a financial asset for 100 Swiss francs. The current market price of the asset is 80 
Swiss francs. What would you do?  
a) I would buy more because the asset costs less b) I would sell because I made a loss c) I would not sell 
because otherwise I would realize a loss d) I would reconsider the investment idea. 
behavior after 
gains 
Suppose you bought a financial asset for 100 Swiss francs. The current market price of the asset is 150 
Swiss francs. What would you do?  
a) I would realize the gain, i.e., I would sell the asset b) I would buy more because I made a gain c) I would 
reconsider the investment idea.  
 
C Additional Empirical Results 
Table C.1: Investment experience 
 Panel A Panel B 
 1 2 3 4 N Swiss bonds 
international 
bonds 
Swiss 
equity 
international 
equity 
Swiss bonds 37.78% 28.06% 27.25% 6.91% 998     
international bonds 59.78% 24.82% 12.46% 2.94% 987 0.77    
Swiss equity 35.92% 29.06% 24.82% 10.19% 991 0.67 0.70   
international equity 54.35% 25.69% 15.56% 4.40% 977 0.54 0.75 0.81  
alternative investments 51.26% 25.93% 17.86% 4.94% 991 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.53 
all asset classes 21.83%   0.84% 953     
 mean st.dev. min. max. N     
Swiss bonds/intern. bonds 1.39 0.67 0.33 4 985     
Swiss equity/intern. equity 1.33 0.60 0.25 4 985     
Swiss assets/intern. assets 1.33 0.49 0.4 3.5 961     
 
Note: Panel A reports the percentages of respondents evaluating their investment experience on a scale with four levels. 1 
represents “no experience”, 2 represents “limited experience”, 3 represents “adequate experience”, and 4 represents 
“extensive experience”. The average experience is the sum of experience levels over all asset classes divided by the number 
of asset classes. The lower part of the panel reports summary statistics. Panel B reports polychoric correlations between 
experience statements across asset classes.1 
 
  
                                                
1 The polychoric correlations estimate what the correlation between households would be if ratings were made 
on a continuous scale. Theoretically, these correlations are invariant to changes in the number of rating 
categories. 
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Table C.2: Construction of an investment experience index 
Panel A     
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1  3.518   2.877   0.704   0.704  
Comp2  0.641   0.171   0.128   0.832  
Panel B     
 Comp. 1 Unexplained variance   
Swiss bonds 0.4385 0.3237   
International bonds 0.4788 0.1935   
Swiss equity 0.4771 0.1992   
International equity 0.4679 0.2299   
Alternative investments 0.3633 0.5358   
 
Note: The table reports results of principal component analysis applied to the experience statements with different asset 
classes based on the matrix of polychoric correlations. The eigenvectors of the first principle are used to form an index of 
investment experience.  
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Table C.3: Information sources weighting  
Panel A     
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
Cumulative 
Variance 
Comp1  2.038   0.611   0.340   0.340  
Comp2  1.428   0.382   0.238   0.578  
Comp3  1.046   0.406   0.174   0.752  
Comp4  0.640   0.129   0.107   0.859  
     
Panel B     
 
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 
Unexplained 
Variance 
price movements  0.666  
  
 0.200  
media news  0.571  
  
 0.395  
own judgment  0.472  
  
 0.332  
friends’ recommendation  
  
 0.878   0.101  
own advisor’s opinion 
 
 0.692  
 
 0.247  
opinion of several advisors 
 
 0.691  
 
 0.213  
 
Note: The table reports results of principal component analysis with varimax rotation applied to the stated importance of 
different information sources on the matrix of polychoric correlations.  
  
 31 
 
Table C.4: Advice seeking with an alternative measure of investment competence 
 decide 
autonomously 
consult 
an advisor 
consult 
several advisors 
delegate 
decisions 
     
investment competence index (alternative) -0.0413** -0.0216** 0.0384** 0.0245** 
 (0.0171) (0.00954) (0.0163) (0.0104) 
price movements, media news, own judgment 0.0519*** 0.0271** -0.0482*** -0.0308*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0108) (0.0183) (0.0116) 
advisor(s) opinion -0.161*** 0.0907*** -0.0168 0.0872*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0271) (0.0287) (0.0170) 
friends’ recommendations -0.0404 -0.0307 0.0885*** -0.0173 
 (0.0278) (0.0291) (0.0330) (0.0194) 
investment experience index 0.0263** 0.0138** -0.0245** -0.0156** 
 (0.0107) (0.00599) (0.0102) (0.00649) 
age -0.00427*** -0.00223** 0.00397*** 0.00253*** 
 (0.00157) (0.000889) (0.00150) (0.000959) 
female 0.0506 0.0243 -0.0466 -0.0283 
 (0.0351) (0.0159) (0.0322) (0.0188) 
higher education -0.00670 -0.00350 0.00623 0.00397 
 (0.0341) (0.0177) (0.0317) (0.0202) 
self employment -0.0392 0.0941 -0.120* 0.0648 
 (0.0563) (0.0737) (0.0650) (0.0508) 
real estate ownership 0.0103 0.00547 -0.00955 -0.00619 
 (0.0340) (0.0185) (0.0317) (0.0208) 
household size -0.000175 -0.0501*** 0.0306* 0.0198* 
 (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0181) (0.0109) 
income (no statement) -0.136** -0.135 0.0949*** 0.176 
 (0.0652) (0.104) (0.0241) (0.181) 
income (<CHF 50,000) 0.0747 -0.179** 0.165 -0.0605 
 (0.112) (0.0816) (0.128) (0.0578) 
income (CHF 50,000-100,000) -0.0380 -0.0208 0.0354 0.0235 
 (0.0443) (0.0254) (0.0411) (0.0286) 
income (CHF 100,000-150,000) -0.0243 -0.0132 0.0227 0.0149 
 (0.0398) (0.0226) (0.0371) (0.0253) 
financial wealth (no statement) 0.398* -0.0390 -0.266*** -0.0931*** 
 (0.204) (0.0958) (0.0916) (0.0231) 
financial wealth (<CHF 100,000) 0.0674 0.0350 -0.0621 -0.0402 
 (0.0464) (0.0243) (0.0425) (0.0282) 
financial wealth (CHF 100,000-200,000) 0.0477 0.0212 -0.0436 -0.0253 
 (0.0535) (0.0201) (0.0480) (0.0255) 
financial wealth (CHF 200,000-300,000) 0.0464 0.0196 -0.0423 -0.0238 
 (0.0678) (0.0225) (0.0601) (0.0300) 
French-speaking -0.00634 -0.00339 0.00590 0.00383 
 (0.0396) (0.0217) (0.0369) (0.0244) 
Italian-speaking 0.0797 0.0282* -0.0709 -0.0369 
 (0.0674) (0.0151) (0.0570) (0.0248) 
N    471 
Pseudo R2    0.1011 
 
Note: The table reports estimated marginal effects of partially proportional odds estimates on the probabilities of choosing 
one of the four delegation options. The investment competence index excludes “Don’t know” answers. The base categories 
for the indicator variables are: male, lower education, employed or job-seeking, no real estate ownership, household’s 
income > CHF 150,000, financial wealth > CHF 300,000, German-speaking. Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by asterisks: *** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1.  
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Table C.5: Advice seeking with interaction terms 
 
 decide 
autonomously 
consult 
an advisor 
consult 
several advisors 
delegate 
decisions 
investment competence index -0.0796** -0.0482** 0.0731** 0.0547** 
 (0.0320) (0.0199) (0.0299) (0.0220) 
investment competence*female 0.0372 0.0225 -0.0342 -0.0255  (0.0253) (0.0154) (0.0233) (0.0174) 
investment competence*income(no statement) -0.00393 -0.00238 0.00361 0.00270  (0.0913) (0.0552) (0.0838) (0.0627) 
investment competence*income (<CHF 50’000) 0.0248 0.0150 -0.0227 -0.0170 
 (0.0511) (0.0309) (0.0470) (0.0351) 
investment competence*income (CHF 50’000-100’000) 0.0296 0.0179 -0.0272 -0.0204  (0.0345) (0.0210) (0.0318) (0.0237) 
investment competence*income (CHF 100’000-150’000) 0.0464 0.0280 -0.0426 -0.0318 
 (0.0375) (0.0228) (0.0346) (0.0257) 
investment competence*French-speaking 0.0511* 0.0309* -0.0469* -0.0351*  (0.0303) (0.0186) (0.0280) (0.0209) 
investment competence*Italian-speaking -0.0423 -0.0256 0.0388 0.0290  (0.0401) (0.0245) (0.0369) (0.0276) 
price movements, media news, own judgment 0.0480*** 0.0153 -0.00352 -0.0597*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0183) (0.0200) (0.0126) 
opinion of advisor(s) -0.146*** 0.0474** 0.00564 0.0931***  (0.0171) (0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0123) 
friends’ recommendations -0.0310 -0.0425* 0.111*** -0.0372**  (0.0197) (0.0220) (0.0240) (0.0151) 
investment experience index 0.0193** 0.0117** -0.0177** -0.0133** 
 (0.00812) (0.00503) (0.00756) (0.00560) 
age -0.0031*** -0.00188*** 0.00285*** 0.00213***  (0.00106) (0.000669) (0.000990) (0.000737) 
female 0.0877 0.0496 -0.0793 -0.0581  (0.0622) (0.0326) (0.0548) (0.0399) 
higher education -0.00586 -0.00354 0.00538 0.00402 
 (0.0230) (0.0139) (0.0211) (0.0158) 
self-employment -0.0142 -0.00906 0.0130 0.0102  (0.0314) (0.0212) (0.0287) (0.0238) 
real estate ownership 0.0308 0.0193 -0.0282 -0.0219  (0.0233) (0.0152) (0.0214) (0.0172) 
household size -0.00612 -0.00370 0.00562 0.00420 
 (0.00862) (0.00523) (0.00793) (0.00592) 
income (no statement) -0.0747 -0.0639 0.0636 0.0749  (0.157) (0.180) (0.106) (0.230) 
income (<CHF 50’000) 0.0691 0.0308 -0.0620 -0.0379  (0.143) (0.0435) (0.124) (0.0629) 
income (CHF 50’000-100’000) 0.0579 0.0333 -0.0528 -0.0384 
 (0.0792) (0.0431) (0.0714) (0.0509) 
income (CHF 100’000-150’000) 0.0741 0.0380 -0.0670 -0.0451  (0.0919) (0.0390) (0.0811) (0.0497) 
financial wealth (no statement) 0.344** -0.00279 -0.243*** -0.0977***  (0.166) (0.0652) (0.0830) (0.0221) 
financial wealth (<CHF 100’000) 0.0707** 0.0451* -0.0641** -0.0517* 
 (0.0350) (0.0235) (0.0312) (0.0274) 
financial wealth (CHF 100’000-200’000) 0.0671 0.0322* -0.0606 -0.0388*  (0.0451) (0.0169) (0.0397) (0.0221) 
financial wealth (CHF 200’000-300’000) 0.0424 0.0212 -0.0386 -0.0251  (0.0555) (0.0224) (0.0496) (0.0283) 
French-speaking 0.106 0.0449* -0.0937 -0.0568 
 (0.0863) (0.0234) (0.0725) (0.0369) 
Italian-speaking -0.0397 -0.0280 0.0360 0.0317  (0.0898) (0.0731) (0.0795) (0.0834) 
N    811 
 
Note: The table reports estimated marginal effects of partially proportional odds estimates on the probabilities of choosing 
one of the four delegation options. The base categories for the indicator variables are: male, lower education, employed or 
job-seeking, no real estate ownership, household’s income > CHF 150’000, financial wealth > CHF 300’000, German-
speaking. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted by asterisks: 
*** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1.   
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Table C.6: Investment competence drivers 
 investment  
competence index (basis) 
investment 
competence index 1 
investment 
competence index 2 
price movements, media news, own judgment -0.0596 -0.114* -0.0678 
 (0.0370) (0.0675) (0.0601) 
advisor(s) opinion 0.00591 0.0155 0.0264 
 (0.0378) (0.0699) (0.0620) 
friends’ recommendations 0.0192 0.0266 -0.0157 
 (0.0458) (0.0851) (0.0766) 
age 0.00224 0.00139 -0.00147 
 (0.00299) (0.00565) (0.00500) 
female -0.150** -0.402*** -0.325*** 
 (0.0650) (0.123) (0.109) 
investment experience index -0.0244 0.00237 -0.00513 
 (0.0235) (0.0454) (0.0398) 
higher education 0.0192 0.00543 9.93e-05 
 (0.0676) (0.128) (0.113) 
self-employment -0.0691 -0.143 -0.132 
 (0.0946) (0.180) (0.159) 
real estate ownership 0.133* 0.228* 0.181 
 (0.0701) (0.128) (0.114) 
household size -0.0134 0.0239 0.0213 
 (0.0267) (0.0495) (0.0439) 
income (no statement) -0.284 -0.444 -0.476 
 (0.271) (0.612) (0.523) 
income (<CHF 50,000) -0.259* -0.510* -0.391 
 (0.146) (0.275) (0.238) 
income (CHF 50,000-100,000) -0.283*** -0.618*** -0.512*** 
 (0.0972) (0.190) (0.168) 
income (CHF 100,000-150,000) -0.266*** -0.578*** -0.452*** 
 (0.0962) (0.188) (0.165) 
financial wealth (no statement) 0.204 0.109 0.238 
 (0.200) (0.432) (0.348) 
financial wealth (<CHF 100,000) 0.0316 -0.123 -0.110 
 (0.105) (0.198) (0.177) 
financial wealth (CHF 100,000-200,000) -0.00102 -0.206 -0.174 
 (0.117) (0.223) (0.197) 
financial wealth (CHF 200,000-300,000) -0.0756 -0.352 -0.234 
 (0.156) (0.294) (0.263) 
French-speaking -0.0640 -0.226 -0.194 
 (0.0793) (0.154) (0.134) 
Italian-speaking -0.330*** -0.662*** -0.594*** 
 (0.109) (0.191) (0.170) 
Constant -1.745*** -4.094*** -3.535*** 
 (0.304) (0.566) (0.507) 
N 815 815 815 
R-squared 0.048 0.068 0.060 
 
Note: The table reports the results OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are 
denoted by asterisks: *** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1.  Index 1 is the sum of investment mistakes (without weights). 
Index 2 is similar to Index 1 but uses the average mistake in the last two questions to take into account their high correlation. 
